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A Survey Made for the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Forces, Far East, and for the Chief of Chaplains of the United States Army. 

By William F. Asbury, Christian Children's Fund, Inc., Richmond, Va. 1954


Since World War 1, the American military man overseas has opened his heart and his purse to boys and girls without homes who wandered the streets or were crammed into children's homes in the turbulent wake of bombs and shells. In World War II, and in the Korean War, on which this study seeks to give some enlightenment, the tremendous military efforts and resultant destruction on world wide fronts in turn meant hundreds of thousands - perhaps millions - of children left homeless temporarily or permanently.

The American G. I., as he tramped into one battered city after another, whether it was Munich or Singapore, Naples or Tokyo or Seoul, always had a chocolate bar or a stick of chewing gum for the ragged children who numbly watched they knew not what. Then when occupations began, or truces were signed the chocolate bars were replaced by dollars and buildings, and everything from vitamin capsules to bicycles.

Korea, especially, was terrible and overwhelmingly pitiful because of the gross suffering of little children. Almost overnight, Korea added a page of violence to her 5000-year-old history, unknown even to violent Asia, and only paralleled by the meticulous destruction in Europe during World War II.  Back and forth along the north-south peninsula rumbled the super-tanks and super-guns and super-efficient bombs and napalm of modern war. As one village after another crumbled - as Korea's million civilians perished - as the blood of men from nearly a score of nations was spilled, crying children peeked from the wreckage-and cried more when they saw a cold and foreign, a destroyed world without love.

Korea had her Hiroshimas and Nagasakis, even without the big bombs. Kim Chun, city of' 50,000 two hours drive north of Taegu, was systematically demolished by the pattern-work bombing of B-29s in an effort to dislodge the dug-in Communists during the critical days of the Pusan perimeter. Chun Chon, on the 38th Parallel; Taejon, city of more than 100,000 where General Deane was lost; these cities and those like Chorwon of the Iron Triangle probably knew a more complete destruction than any cities since the sack of Carthage. After the bombs and shells came the mop-up demolition of street fighting where grenades and small arms finished the destruction with the same thoroughness that a Korean farmer chops down each and every straw in his barley field.

By the time the fighting stopped in the late summer of 1953, 100,000 children were without homes or unaccompanied. The story this survey seeks to tell is the one that began in 1950 when the UN troops saw the misery of these children and then started to do something about helping.

Military Giving.   This is the first time anywhere that the Army Corps of Chaplains has expressed its desire for the help of a private and specialized civilian agency in learning facts about military giving to children. Soldiers, airmen and sailors gave generously. The following pages will seek to show that their big heartedness, admittedly not properly measured in dollars and cents, is likewise big business even when measured only this way.

A good deal of attention is given in the following paragraphs to the extensive work for Korean orphans by various official and voluntary agencies. This is provided with the hope that the Chaplains in Korea (and the Far East) may benefit from seeing the larger scene of children's work to which he and his men have given so much.

Inaccuracies.  There will doubtless be certain inaccuracies in this report both in statistics and in certain reported "facts". The large scope of the survey makes these inevitable. It is to be hoped, however, that the reader will give special attention to the general conclusions and recommendations. These are believed to be important in spite of possible statistical errors or occasional misinformation because they attempt to look at "the big picture." These conclusions and recommendations are believed to have a modicum of validity

Briefing and thanks. The writer had a complete briefing by Chaplain James E. Wilson, Chief of Chaplain, Army Forces Far East, and his staff, on the activities of Chaplains in Korea prior to leaving Tokyo for Seoul. It was gratifying and enlightening to learn the broader aspects of a Chaplain's job in the field, and to know that his concern for the needs of a destitute people, and especially children, is accepted as a primary challenge and serious responsibility even though completely separate from his assigned tasks.

To Chaplain Wilson, and his counterparts in the Navy (Chaplain Whitman) and Air Force (Chaplain Hamel), sincerest thanks are extended for their full cooperation. Of course warm gratitude goes out to General John Hull, Commander in Chief, United Nations Command, Far East, and to Chaplain (Maj. Gen. ret.) Ivan L. Bennett, former Chief of Chaplains, U. S. Army and Chaplain (Maj. Gen.) Patrick Ryan, present Chief of Chaplains, who expressed their desire that this study be made by Christian Children's Fund, Inc. Chaplain Bennett instituted the basic plan. Special thanks, too, for the generous help of Mr. Thomas Metskar, Civilian Welfare Director of the Korean Civil Assistance Command, who is probably the best-informed expert on child-welfare problems in Korea. The Korean Minister of Social Welfare, Dr. Solemn Park and his associate ministers, KCAC Provincial Team commanders and officers, the American-Korea Foundation, Chaplains in the Field, Deputy and Area Commanders of the 8th Army and Fifth Air Force, and Military Unit Commanders in both the front lines and rear areas were consulted, and they helped to the fullest to provide information and all other assistance.


In brief, the purpose of this survey is to learn what military personnel have done to help orphanages in Korea.  In the first place to learn statistically, and in the second place to learn how the giving has been handled and the results it has brought.

The survey looks to the day when military units will be leaving Korea. Press reports for some time have stated that a phase-out program, will be well underway by 1955, and recent news releases from the Pentagon report that several Divisions and the 5th Air Force have been assigned new destinations already. This study, then, looks toward these days when military men, who, without doubt have saved the lives of many Korean children, leave the Peninsula. It looks especially to the great void that will be left in support to Korean orphanages and other work for children when the financial and material help of individual military men is not available.

According to available statistics almost two-thirds of the voluntary contributions of soldiers in the 8th Army who gave to public welfare activities in Korea went to the orphanages. Thus it is deemed important to know more about soldier giving.

It should be added that though the needs of children in Japan and Okinawa are not now as critical as those in Korea many of the observations, conclusions and recommendations here will be pertinent to these other areas.

Critical Problem. The problem of what happens when military personnel leave Korea is of great concern to the government of the Republic of Korea, to the Korea Civil Assistance Command (KCAC), and to the voluntary agencies working in Korea. Again and again, in explaining the survey to those who had information, this concern was made clear.

The Provincial Team Welfare Officer for KCAC in Kyung Gi Province said bluntly, "When the military units leave Korea, children will be on the streets again."

Pitfalls. Another purpose of this paper is to point out certain pitfalls which are always present in any altruism, but which are especially prevalent when charity is available to people who have become as desperate and destitute and suffered as the Koreans.

Deceits are sometimes well worked out. One of the welfare officers in

KCAC headquarters in Seoul reported a case where several mixed-blood children, particularly those with outstanding Western features such as blue eyes, blond or red hair, or of negro paternity, were brought to a chaplain's office on a certain U.S. Army base. With weeping and wringing of hands, the orphanage superintendent told of her general suffering and then this new problem which, she implied, was clearly his. "Therefore support my orphanage," was the unmistakable plea.

One of the KOAC Team workers heard the story from the chaplain. But from a different chaplain at another distant base, he had heard the same story, and a check-up revealed that the identical part-negro, blue-eyed, blond and redheaded children were paraded before several military commanders and chaplains. These "special children" were available, probably for a price, to orphanage superintendents who sought money from military personnel. Probably this operation was eminently successful though no facts were available to bear out the success.

Intervention. Sometimes military personnel have made errors by intervening in the administration of the orphanages a little too far. An institution called Angela Orphanage had good quarters in a rented house in Suwon, Kyung Gi Province, south of Seoul. An Air Force Chaplain and the Provost Marshall of a base near Suwon took considerable interest in the Angela Orphanage when it was in Suwon. Then both were transferred several miles further south to another base at Osan. They promised the superintendent of the Angela Orphanage, that since they still had an interest in the orphanage, it would be wiser if she moved it, with its 22 children to Osan. They promised to buy land, to provide materials from the base, and to interest men at the new base in her work. A building program was also promised. The superintendent and the children moved into very ramshackle, "temporary" quarters just outside the air base. A few weeks later the Provost Marshall was transferred and within days after that, the Chaplain was transferred.

Angela Orphanage now has more than 40 children. Newcomers to K-55, the air base, didn't have the same interest as their predecessors. The temporary shacks and borrowed land have necessarily become permanent. Children live in very bad surroundings and under bad conditions among the Korean camp followers who set up business all around the base. This happened in 1953, and new Chaplains at the base are doing their best to remedy the situation.

Thus, the purpose of this work is to shed light on bad situations and try to foresee for Chaplains in Korea how they happen. The "plus" side of the ledger of military help to orphanages is far greater than the occasional errors. U.S. Ambassador Ellis 0. Briggs reported in July of this year that he was greatly impressed by the voluntary help given by soldiers and that it was one of the many brighter aspects of his work. He said that almost every day he received a letter from a returned Korean veteran who wanted legally to adopt a Korean child, or had a soldier still in Korea visit the Embassy who wanted to leave money for a child, or another who had, returned who wanted to send money back to a child.  Ambassador Briggs described this "Second Mile" kind of act on the part of the soldier for Korean children as being like "a child who breaks open his piggy bank so he can put in another 20 cents." Another purpose of this study is to analyze this generous giving.

The need for the survey was recognized by Chaplain (Maj. Gen. ret.) Ivan L. Bennett and implemented by his successor, Chaplain (Maj. Gen.) Patrick Ryan. Concurrence that the study be made and fullest cooperation given came from General John Hull, Commander in Chief, United Nations Command, Tokyo. Thus this is a study for the benefit of ail United States as well as United Nations Military Forces who have been active in helping Korean orphans.

Christian Children's Fund made this survey at its own expense. No financial assistance or logistical support in Korea was accepted. Christian Children's Fund has committed itself to complete or substantial partial support of 8000 Korean children who have lost their homes during the recent war. According to Dr. J. Calvitt Clarke, the Director of Christian Children's Fund, CCF feels a deep responsibility in the continued care of Korean children who suffered from the war. It has always been the desire of CCF to work in cooperation with the Chaplains who are often stationed near the orphanages helped by CCF around the world. Christian Children's Fund seeks to work hand in hand with them and to coordinate its activities with their own. This survey is an enlargement of that policy. CCF has many military contributors who have seen needs overseas and then returned to America to help meet the needs through the organization.


a. Introduction and Explanation

It is impossible to measure statistically the affection poured out by men in Korea towards the wonderful Korean children. At every orphanage, a little Kim Sung Hi or Lee Myung Hung knew a 'Mac" or a "Mike" or a Chaplain Somebody whom they ran to greet as their friends, lifelong friends. These men usually came loaded down with good things from the PX, or boxes of clothing and food from home. But even holding a child in his arms - a child who may never have known his parents, was a two-way street of sharing that undoubtedly has greater significance than numbers can show.

It's also impossible to measure the international good will that is generated by men who love children and who go out of their way to help them. Foreign relations between nation and nation might very well be influenced by such soldier - child relationships.

b. Numbers of Orphans and Orphanages

Before 1950. It is not commonly known, but even before June 1950 there were several thousand orphaned children in Korea. Korea's men were part of the Japanese Imperial Forces. They died in battle, were held as PW's in the distant posts of a captured Empire; they fled as refugees just as Japanese soldiers and their families did. They often were simply reported "missing" and left their families without support. Then when Japan lost Korea, half a million Koreans remained in Japan. They are still there. Continuing political differences have kept fathers and mothers, and children, separated by the Sea of Japan. Children entered orphanages in increasing numbers up until the day of Communist aggression in 1950.

True Statistics?  There are many difficulties in getting true statistics about the number of children in orphanages. The orphanages in Korea have often "padded" their figures on the number of their children. In this way they might get more assistance from KCAC or from military donors. Or, orphanages have placed on their rolls the names of children living in the same-or a near-by town. When checks were made, the children could be said to be "in school' and then soon brought in for the counting of noses.

"Orphans". It should be made clear that the term "orphan" when applied to children not only in Korea but in most countries is a misnomer. Though, on a per capita reckoning there are probably more institutionalized war orphans in Korea than in any other country today, it is still true that many of the children in orphanages have at least one parent. That mother or father however may have lost everything in the war - home, land, livelihood, husband or wife. He or she may live in a refugee camp and be completely unable to take care of the child. Such destitution may have led to abandoning the child. Or the upheaval of the Korean War may have separated parent and child, as it did in thousands of cases.

Thus, though the word "orphan" is used for convenience sake, "homeless children" or "unaccompanied children" may be more accurate in many instances.

There are agencies in Korea that will soon begin work on trying to reunite parents and children. Christian Children's Fund, with case histories on 8,000 children, has made it known that its files in Korea are available to those who seek to accomplish such reunions.

June and July, 1954, Numbers.  As of 1 June 1954 there were 429 approved orphanages, and 50,936 children in the approved orphanages in Korea. July statistics for 1954, issued jointly by the ROK Welfare Ministry and KCAC, showed that there were increases in the number of children in orphanages that averaged about 1000 children per month!

KCAC estimated that there were at least 150 unapproved orphanages in Korea. These do not receive KCAC relief supplies. In Kyungi Province, which surrounds Metropolitan Seoul, an accurate accounting of unapproved orphanages showed there were 15 without Government and KCAC approval. There are 53 approved orphanages in the Province.

The largest number of orphanages in any one city is in Seoul with 34 approved institutions. Pusan is second with 31. These are June, 1954 figures from the Government.

Increases.  The following table shows the increases in numbers 'of children in orphanages from 1945 through 1954. KCAC figurers released in June 1954:

1945 1,523
1946 4,317
1948 5,284
June, 1950 (War) 7,000
June, 1951 10,821
June, 1952 25,839
June, 1953 43,625
June, 1954 50,936


The increase from 1945 to 1950 shows, in addition to difficulties because Korean fathers didn't come home from battles, the refugee movement from North Korea when Communist tyrannies began there, refugees had to leave all they owned to run the boycott of the 38th parallel. They arrived poor and often broken.

Also, one KCAC official speculated that the presence of American military units in Korea had something to do with the sharp rise in the number of children in orphanages during these years. To the orphanage superintendents, the presence of American soldiers meant dollars. Dollars meant an ability to care for more children, to expand facilities.

c. What Was Given - in Dollars

Conflicting Reports. There have been many conflicting statistics given on what military personnel have done in terms of dollars and cents for help to the Koreans. (This is the first attempt, however, to give a breakdown on just what was given to orphans).

Dr. Howard Rusk, of the America-Korea Foundation (AKF), for example, was quoted in a wire dispatch dated June 8, 1954, as saying that $13 million had been given by soldiers in Korea to "sick and injured Koreans, and to Korea's 10 million homeless refugees and 100,000 orphans."

The VFW Magazine, in its May 24, 1954 issue, reported: American troops stationed in Korea have voluntarily contributed more than 25 million dollars from their own pay for relief and construction work in Korea....". The VFW Magazine gave no supporting statistics nor authority for this figure which was the largest reported and which is inconsistent with records of the 8th Army, 5th Air Force and Commandant, Naval Forces, Far East. Perhaps the article was including the $15 million granted by the U. S. Army in Washington, D.C. for the Armed Forces Aid to Korea Program, and also the money which military personnel gave to various funds that were neither for the direct nor indirect benefit of Koreans. These qualifications make the figure no less impressive nor less important.

The following figures, based on an attempt by the 8th Army in Korea to evaluate giving by soldiers since 1950, seem to have more validity. They were prepared for briefing Mr. Harold Stasson, Director of the Mutual Security Agency during his recent trip to Korea. Eighth Army statistics showed that "Troop Aid (Voluntary), from I July 1950 through 31 October 1953 was estimated to be $1,156,194.63."

The word "estimated" was inserted because during most of 1950 and 1951, very few military units in Korea bothered with comprehensive records of Troop Aid.  The 8th Army figure for Mr. Stassen was based on records available. However it is believed to be on the conservative side.

Best Available Statistics. The Deputy Chief of Staff of the 8th Army, who is also the executive director of Armed Forces Aid to Korea, released the following memorandum to be used in this report. These figures are based on actual reports from military commanders all over Korea. Though they are only for the 8th Army, and do not include the 5th Air Force and the Navy, their accuracy seems most plausible; they are also up-to-date.

"In addition to his duties of aiding the people of Korea in a post-armistice program of preparedness and reconstruction, the American soldier has made an enormous extracurricular contribution to the people at home and in Korea.

"Matching his prowess in the field with his generous pocket, the Eighth Army soldier has this year aided seven worthy causes with contributions totaling nearly one and a half million dollars. Added to reported contributions and materials donated since June 1950 to aid Korea, this figure climbs to over 3 million dollars.

"It is a proud record in that it was achieved through the individual and collective and wholly voluntary effort of the officers and men of the U.S. 8th Army.

Following is a list of organizations which benefited by the generosity of the 8th Army soldiers:

March of Dimes $600,896
Pusan Fire 31,870
American Red Cross $416,333
Aid to Korea Fund 23,736
Aremy Emergency Relief $151,145
Crusade for Freedom $9,400
Cancer Fund $108,979


"Over and above the previously mentioned donations totaling $1,261,643.00 and such relief items as clothing, food and materials having a value of $550,110.97 given by the men of the 8th Army from the time of the outbreak of the war in 1950 until the establishment of AFAK in November 1953.

"Voluntary troop contributions since November 1953 used separately or jointly with appropriated AFAK funds totaled $24,063.00.

"The total of all voluntary contributions (cash and materials) by men of the 8th Army since June 1950 exclusive of special drives prior to 1954 amount to $1,835,822.97.

"The overall contributions including cash and materials to all the above mentioned causes amount to $3,178,184.91."

AFAK Records. Since the Armed Forces Aid to Korea program began in 1954 (November) each military commander in the 8th Army has had to submit a report on the voluntary contributions of their men each month. These contributions are called by AFAK recorders "Category B, non-construction assistance."  The total of such contributions from November 1953 to May 1954 was listed at $856,401.00. For these seven months, the voluntary troop aid, of only the 8th Army, averaged more than 100 thousand dollars per month.

From the records submitted by the military commanders, headquarters recorders for AFAK break the giving down into four sections: Public Welfare, Education, Public Health and Religion. Public Welfare represents during these seven months 64 per cent of the total, or, if we use a rough average of 100 thousand dollars per month, this would mean that $64,000 per month went to Public Welfare. Carefully going over projects listed under "Public Welfare" revealed that almost 100 per cent of them were orphanages.

To verify this, and to get statistics on the Air Force and Navy as well, a spot check of all records of contributions to Korean orphanages was made on reports for May and June, 1954. This revealed-that $55,406.99 actually went to orphanages, on an average, during each of these two months.

Estimate Since 1950. On the basis of the above spot check, it is safe to assume that $55,000 per month has been a continuing amount to Korean orphanages. Assuming, for convenience, that it has only been $50,000, it is safe to say that this has been the monthly amount given since June of 1952 when the war more or less stabilized along its present lines. For the 24 months from June, 1952, to June, 1954, this would mean that a total of $1,200,000 went to orphanages.

Even if only half of $50,000 - or $25,000 per month was given during 1951, an additional $300,000 would bring the total to $l,500,000. Allowing that even during 1950 logistical troops were helping some orphanages back of the line, and that much of the giving over the 4 years has never been recorded, it is safe to estimate that a total of $2 million has actually gone to Korean orphanages in cash and material in the form of voluntary troop contributions!

Chaplains. In giving consideration to just what has been done for orphans in Korea, chaplains should consider the above figures. Many- perhaps most - of these "voluntary- contributions" have been channeled through them, or were controlled by them, or directed on their advice.

In arriving at the above figures and estimates, only Public Welfare records were studied. It is probable that some help to orphanages was included under the Public Health, Education and Religion sections.

Increasing Giving? Gifts to orphanages have doubtless increased since 1950 and are probably still increasing. In 1950 there was too much for the soldier to do to be concerned with his charity money, and accounting for it. But since AFAK was begun in 1953, publicity about the program has probably stimulated interest in giving. The official nature of AFAK perhaps has made military personnel aware of Korea's welfare problems and the importance of helping with them. Most interesting of these, for the men, are the orphanages.

Christmas Parties.  As in interesting footnote to this substantial help to orphanages was an 8th Army report on Christmas parties given by soldiers in 1953. The Army personnel (again, 6th Air Force and the Navy are not included) gave a total of 481 -Parties.  Korean attendance (mostly orphan and school children) amounted to 181,296. Gifts amounted to $496,117.23 or almost $1000 per party.


Official. It would be wrong not to include a few brief statements on the Armed Forces Aid to Korea (AFAK) program because soldiers have given of their time and effort so unstintingly in 1953 and 1954. Though AFAK is official it is a plan that has been right in line with voluntary contributions, and, in fact, has doubtless spurred such contributions. AFAK is the only military program in Korea so far which has sought to learn where and how much military personnel have given to help Koreans. This has been of great help in preparing the previous statistics and estimates.

In short, Armed Forces Aid to Korea is a reconstruction program involving $15 million worth of available military materials in Korea. Engineering units put these materials, their construction equipment, and themselves to work to do various projects of reconstruction or new construction. General Maxwell B. Taylor is the AFAK director for all services in Korea. His office must investigate and approve the hundreds of Korean applicants who present their plans and desired projects through local military base commanders near their orphanages, schools etc.

Military Operation. Col. John Bowen, Deputy Commander of the 8th Army, and executive director of AFAK, said that troop aid and AFAK were considered to be military operations.

He said the specific considerations which prompted AFAK were that 1. a great Army in the field was no longer fighting a war, 2. materials were available, 3. great ideological and political implications were connected with reconstruction of South Korea and compassion for the losses of Koreans.

It might be added that AFAK was usually where the troops were, and the troops in Korea are still where destruction was worst. Whole villages, and even towns, have been restored along the razed 38th parallel, because of AFAK.

Operations involving $15 Million. Of the original $15 million allotted by the Department of Defense to AFAK, Engineering detachments of the various divisions and services were given the lion's share of $13,819,647.12 by virtue of the fact they would be called upon to put the funds to use. The specific allotment of materials was as follows:

5th Air Force $3 Million
X Corps $1.5 Million
KComZ $3 Million
Army Service Area $1.5 Million
I Corps $1.5 Million
Pusan $1.825 Million
IX Corps $1.5 Million
Medical 725,000

A total of 1828 projects - repair or building of schools, hospitals, orphanages, houses, roads, bridges, resettlement of families - was approved.  An additional 526 projects were applied for as of May 1, 1954.

AFAK Orphanages. Under AFAK 50 orphanage projects were either completed or almost completed between November of 1953 and May of 1954; 65 more were underway. These were not always the building of complete facilities but often they were.

The Buk Han San orphanage north of Seoul, on the Uijongbu road, is an excellent example of what AFAK has been doing. The 314th Ordnance Group had given a great deal of money and material contributions to the 123 children in the orphanage. When AFAK was announced, Col. A. C. Wells, Commanding Officer of the 314th Group, arranged for an AFAK project. Materials for buildings were allotted. Korean farmers near the children's home (then housed in tents), took an interest in their own children, went to work to cut local stone for the new buildings. The men in the 314 contributed more than $10,000 to pay for additional labor required - for carpenters, ondol" (radiant heated floors) workers, and other construction workers. A women's club in Philadelphia learned of the 314th's work, took an interest and provided funds through the America-Korea Foundation. Secretary of Defense Wilson broke the ground for this orphanage recently and Mrs. Wilson contributed a sizeable gift toward the building costs.

Colonel Wells estimated that the completed three buildings (one for a school, one for dormitory rooms, another for dining facilities and meeting hall) would have cost well over $100,000, or about 10 times the AFAK investment.

Negotiations were underway as this survey was being completed to have Christian Children's Fund take over the supervision of any funds left when the 314th Group might leave Korea. It might be added that Christian Children's Fund in America approved giving its regular continuing support to the Buk Han San orphanage as assurance that the fine buildings would be able to be maintained, and the children to have security whether the 314th Ordnance Group remained in Korea or was reassigned.

Unparalleled. AFAK was indeed a fine plan, a stroke of genius and unparalleled in military history. It is a perfect example of "turning swords into plowshares and spears into pruning hooks.".   It is perhaps, the best antidote to Communist propaganda that still filters into South Korea. It was especially important, because it coupled itself, in the building of orphanages, to the voluntary giving of the soldiers - to the man-to-child relationship that cannot be over emphasized.


Results. It is important to remember that though the basic motivation of all giving is usually good, the results of such giving may not be equally as good.

An example could be found in Pusan, in 1952, when about a million and a half desperately needed refugees milled about, living in shacks and indescribably poor conditions in this southern Korean city.  At that time literally piles of high-heeled shoes, sent in relief parcels, lined the so-called "free market."  Some of the shoes were obviously expensive, and little worn.  Doubtless many of them had been given generously.  They were on sale for a few cents a pair - even fancy alligator pumps with much wear left - but there were few buyers because even though desperately in need of foot-gear, Korea's mud and rocks and snow made it impossible for women to walk in high-heeled shoes, and perhaps more important, because Korean women don't wear high-heeled shoes.

Diapers or Milk.  Similar things have happened in giving to the orphanages.  In one case, a Mrs. Kang Jung Ae, who is superintendent of the Taegu City Foundling Home, was given 500 diapers by a Chaplain stationed in Taegu.  This was in 1952.  There were almost 150 infants in the Foundling Home at the time.  The Chaplain thought 500 diapers (an expensive contribution) would help Mrs. Kang to improved the health of the babies, most of whom were very ill because of earlier exposure and malnutrition.

But one day the Chaplain learned that most or al the diapers had reached the black market.  He was understandably concerned.  Mrs. Kang was called to a missionary residence where she could speak in her own language to a local missionary and account for her actions to the Chaplain.

"Yes, I sold the diapers," she admitted tearfully.  "I bought milk with the money.  I needed diapers, it's true.  But without milk my babies would die."

Early Help.  In 1950, it wasn't a question of what to give, but to give something.  G.I.s gave candy and canned food to the forsaken children they encountered on their marches.  It is a fact that for a time this was practically all the outside support the children then had.

As the months passed, however, many of the military units did admirably in their giving, adjusting from the haphazard giving of those early days to planned giving and looking toward the future, when, indeed, the future was still difficult to see, or to know if there was one.

The 2nd Division set up a large trust fund for the Friendship Orphanage which as near their rear area.  This fund reached almost $80,000.

The 5th Regimental Combat Team supported Boys Town, on Ranji Island near Seoul.  Their giving was continuing and dependable and averaged as much as $1,000 per month which funds were turned over to the YMCA. 

The Wolfhound regiment of the 25th Infantry Division has given about $175,000 to an orphanage in Osaka.  The 25th has been in Korea and Japan a long time, and every pay day while there were there, the men lined up and gave to the orphanage as soon as they were paid.  They have a sense of responsibility toward their Osaka children.  (This giving is still going on, by he way.)

Likewise, the 1st.Cavalry Division, when it came to Korea, continued to support several orphanages in Japan, and to keep in touch with them when the men were on leave in Japan.

Misdirection. There are however, examples of really substantial but unfortunately misdirected efforts involving thousands upon thousands of dollars afforded on behalf of orphanages in Korea. One of the most notable is that of the Happy Mountain Orphanage in Pusan.

The Commanding Officer of the 2nd Logistical Command in Pusan, not long after the  war began, started complete support to this orphanage which for all practical  purposes he founded. It had as of Sept. 1, 1952, more than 350 children.

Then the Korean Base Section, another logistical organization, took over when this  first interested commander loft Korea. Then the Pusan Military Post gave some  support, but both of the succeeding units gave far less than the original sponsoring officer, and nothing like "complete support."

When the first Commanding Officer (a man who had such paternal pride in the orphanage as "his baby" learned that it wasn't the largest orphanage in Korea, in spite of cautioning about the really serious overcrowding that then existed, immediately wanted to round up additional children) left Korea, the Happy Mountain Orphanage was thrust upon the Welfare Ministry of the Republic of Korea. The government has been plagued with a terrific headache since. Its welfare coffers have been empty since the earliest days of the war; an orphanage of 350 children - consistent with the military commanders desires, one of the largest orphanages in Korea - was a terrible financial drain on the government, especially because in his desire for the biggest orphanage he also had a desire commendable enough, for the best.  And while in Korea he secured ample money and goods. He hired workers profligately, to a far greater extent than the necessary  government policies of meeting minimum needs everywhere. Thus when the government was forced to take over, the orphanage was greatly overstaffed, and since many of the staffers were hangers-on, there was great difficulty in forcing them from their quarters and rations. On June 7 of this year, what was left of the Happy Mountain Orphanage - a mere handful of children, moved to Seoul.  It was at one time, probably the best-known orphanage in Korea, visited by all dignitaries.

Munske Orphanage. A similar thing happened at the Munske Orphanage in Seoul. When Seoul was liberated first, the homeless children there - (a thousand were collected on the streets of the desolate, ruined city) - were sent to the Orphans Home of Korea on Cheju Island in a dramatic airlift operation.

When the second liberation took place, again hundreds of orphaned children were found. A Colonel Munske, Commanding Officer of the first KCAC team in Seoul, started an orphanage for these children. It was another very large project that by Sept. 1, 1952, reached 575 in number. The story was repeated, however; Munske was reassigned. With him went the keen interest that had kept the money flowing in for the children. Very unfortunately the orphanage had to be disbanded.  Many of the children could be transferred to other orphanages; many others were back on the streets as beggars and vagrants.

Chun Chon Orphanage. A Masonic organization at Chun Chon, just below the 38th parallel, wanted to help an orphanage with funds they had available. There was no good orphanage nearby, though children without homes in Chun Chon were many. The Square and Compass Club at a nearby base discussed the orphanage with Chun Chon City officials and were given land on which to build a new children's home. The club gave more than $7,000 and the orphanage was built; 60 children were admitted. Then the Club, and other interested men on the base, wrote to their homes in America and asked that families and friends send clothing, toys and food for the orphanage. These began to arrive almost by the carload.  Soon, however, many of the things began to appear on the black market. The Masonic Club was very disappointed, interest in the orphanage waned, and all support was stopped.

The city of Chun Chon, without any funds for orphanages, nor any welfare work except keeping its people alive, was forced to take over the orphanage and run it. Standards immediately dropped very low. This orphanage, like any, has tremendous continuing expenses, and the people of Chun Chon are without means to meet them.

The problem here was that once the children were in the home, it was next to impossible - morally or physically - to say,  "Get out. Go to the home you haven't got".

Whether it would have been better not to start the project in the first place, is very difficult to say. These were needy children in Chun Chon. The Masons saw the need but because of their inability to operate the orphanage themselves, they were soon turned away from supporting it because the materials they had given reached the black market. In one drive for support from America, a very large number of toys arrived - enough for several for each child in the orphanage. In Korea, to have toys at all is practically an unknown luxury. To have more than one for each child is unheard of. The superintendent evidently felt justified in selling all or most of them to get money for food, as the toys were soon reported on the black market.

"Top Three Orphanages"

In another case, an NCO club at a military base not far from Seoul gave more than $8000 in cash, to an orphanage of about 120 children near their base. The superintendent, upon investigation, was found to have used the money for everything except the children. Church leaders in the town reported that she operated a house of prostitution and that some of the money had gone into modernization of these facilities. She drank heavily and often appeared on the streets drunk. She seldom stayed at the orphanage where the children lived not much better than little animals, in rags in spite of the fact that the NCO club had also taken many boxes of relief clothes to the orphanage. There were only two matrons for the 120 children.

Since this was a large base, the several Chaplains investigated the difficulties and recommended that the NCO Club stop giving to the orphanage which had posted a sign saying that its name was now "The Top Three Orphanage," for the top three graders who supported it. The decision to stop helping was not easy because the children were still there, and even if only a small portion of the money given went for their benefit, it was so desperately needed that the Sergeants hesitated stopping even when confronted with the superintendent's aberrations.

New Project. The base was supporting two other orphanages in the area. The Chaplains organized a committee of the NCO representatives and officers on the base interested in the various orphanages being helped. Members of Christian Children's Fund's Korea staff were called in to act in an advisory capacity.

The CCF representatives contacted both KCAC and the Kyung Gi government welfare office to learn that two of the orphanages being supported by the base were definitely earmarked for enforced closure by the government.

A plan was worked out by CCF, KCAC and the government and recommended to the Chaplains' orphanage committee. This plan suggested that 1.  a separate and new orphanage be built with money available on the base, 2. children from the three homes would be sent to the new project, 3. help from the base and from the government to the three errant orphanages be stopped. (This would include both the military giving and the rice, which the government gives from KCAC supplies.   Unless the military giving were stopped these very bad institutions can continue to function, and if only government aid were stopped, superintendents had an oven stronger plea.), 4. the government would recommend a proper superintendent for the new orphanage.

The government also pledged to 1. try to find rice land to help support the orphanage, 2. to establish a committee for the superintendent, 3. help set up a juridical person to give the orphanage legal status.

The Chaplains and their committee seemed pleased at the cooperation of the specialized agencies and the government and pledged to provide funds for the new buildings (securing an AFAK project if possible), to provide substantial continuing support while they were in Korea, and to leave money in trust after they left Korea.

Trust Funds - the 45th Division. There are many examples of how military units did the right thing by orphanages in which they were interested from the very beginning. The 46th Division, with units on Che ju Do, Korea's, large island to the south, left a trust fund for the Orphans Home of Korea, an orphanage of nearly 700 children (1000 at one time), the largest in Korea. The amount was substantial - $41,000. Lt. Col. Edgar Poole, former adjutant of the Division, reported that the money was placed in an interest-bearing trust fund by the 45th Division Association now in Oklahoma. Interest is being channeled through the 8th Army, and, if the 8th Army leaves, will be channeled through the American consulate. To be more accurate, the 8th Army and the Consulate agreed to act in an advisory capacity and to check on the use of the funds by the Orphanage.

Only the interest is to be used until such time as a worthy project of augmentation of the orphanage's facilities or construction of new buildings is presented to the Division Association. Capital may be advanced if the Association desires to do so upon being convinced that the immediate use of the capital will benefit the orphanage more than the continued investment and interest thus earned.


The Most for Orphanages. It should be mentioned at the outset that the Korea Civil Assistance Command reports that it takes care of about 65 per cent of the needs of children in orphanages. (The difference, if it is made up, is done so by soldier contributions and by the voluntary agencies.)

KCAC has done the most for orphanages in Korea. Their mission has been to prevent disease, starvation and unrest. Failure to help homeless children would have meant failures in all these categories. The official organization works in close integration with the ROK Welfare and Health ministries.

What KCAC Gives. To the approved orphanages KCAC distributes these supplies regularly:

Grain (Rice or Barley) One pound (3 Korean "hop") per child per day.
Powdered Milk 40g per child per day
Used Clothing adequate for basic needs (except school uniforms)
Blankets adequate for basic needs
Building Materials for winter proofing, repairs and alterations
Distribution of CARE packages Occasional other help from UN member nations - especially canned foods

KCAC Policy. KCAC policy regarding orphanages is very important for Chaplains in Korea to know now. Good orphanages are being selected for continued help. Second class, or subpar orphanages, will be given a minimum of support in the future. (The Korean Ministry of Welfare, who actually give out the KCAC materials, went further and said they would implement KCAC policy by actually forcing bad orphanages to close and transfer their children to good orphanages.

Major Command. The Korea Civil Assistance Command became a major command, responsible to the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Forces, in 1953.

Thus it is primarily a U. S. Army, soldier-staffed, organization now under the guidance of General F. L. Hayden. There are both Department of Army Civilian specialists and United Nations health, welfare, transportation and supply officers working with KCAC. Their cooperative efforts with the Army have been commendable and the net results excellent.

It is interesting to see a Paratrooper Lt. Colonel, or an Artillery Colonel suddenly placed as Commander of a Provincial KCAC Team, confronting serious welfare and health problems completely outside their experience. Some of these commanders have acquitted themselves admirably as have their Army subordinates. When and if KCAC leaves Korea - with no successor organization to discharge its specific and direct tasks of staving off disease, unrest and starvation - the orphanages In Korea will have great difficulty in carrying on.


a. Voluntary Agencies

KAVA. There is now in Korea an organization of voluntary agencies called the Korea Association of Voluntary Agencies (KAVA). The bulletin of the First Annual Meeting of KAVA listed 31 member voluntary agencies. It was announced at the meeting that since the Korean War started $35 million worth of cash and materials have been given to various relief activities. During the first three months of 1954 it was announced that $3 million worth of material and cash was given to Korean relief by its many secular and religious member agencies.

For the purpose of this report it is necessary to point out that not all of this went to Korean orphanages. Most of the agencies have very broad programs of relief, though many include orphanage work. Among the three large Protestant Missionary groups working in Korea - namely the Presbyterian, Methodist and Holiness Missions - none supply complete support to orphanages affiliated with their local Korean churches, nor are there more than one or two instances where their workers are assigned to full-time orphanage work. All of these, and the other denominations working in Korea, however, have taken much interest in helping orphanages which, since 1950 have sprung up and understandably called themselves "Presbyterian", "Methodist" or "Holiness" because a Presbyterian Minister, or a Methodist Deacon or a Holiness Elder may have helped start them or may have become their superintendents.

Among the Catholic groups working in Korea, the Columban Fathers, and Maryknoll Fathers conduct orphanages within the very broad framework and large programs of the National Catholic Welfare Council. The Council, as in the cases of the Protestant missions, announced that it gives "partial support" and relief supplies to 45 orphanages.

Chaplains' Help. Chaplains and other military personnel have been very helpful to the Voluntary Agencies. Especially during the earlier days of the war, it would have been impossible for the various missions to carry out their various important tasks without the Chaplains' help.

Also, military personnel have contributed a great deal of money, materials and time in aiding the voluntary agencies. CARE, among secular agencies, has a good program whereby military personnel can purchase food and other designated relief packages through PXs in Korea. Many of those have been directed to orphanages.

Used Clothing. Used clothing has been only one of the relief programs of the voluntary agencies, and has been very important. It might be easy to overrate the importance of giving used clothing from now on, however.

Some voluntary agency representatives in Korea, seeing the piles of used clothing arrive each week, have vocally wondered whether a saturation point has been reached. Probably it has for the "clean-out-your-closet" type of package. In many cases, only rags are sent out and in such cases, the value, especially to children, is possibly less than if the amount spent on postage to get the box to Korea were turned into a cash donation.

So often adult clothing far outnumbers the children's clothing, more in need. Then, too, the Koreans - a proud people even in their despair - don't wear what Americans wear. Even if there were the aftermath of atomic warfare in New York City, very few New York women would be seen on 5th Avenue's rubble strewn sidewalks in worn out Korean "chogoris" (women's dresses) or Japanese Kimonos sent as relief items by sympathetic Korean and Japanese women in Seoul and Tokyo through the Buddhist League. Thus, new materials, food, equipment or cash donations to Korea are probably now far more effective than used clothing.

Especially for the orphanages, giving material suitable for making school uniforms is about the finest gift possible. Schools in Korea have stuck stubbornly, and probably wrongly, to the tradition of having children wear uniforms. These represent a very heavy financial burden for the orphanages. But without a uniform, a child is not accepted in school nor by his classmates as being normal. For the boys, either blue or grey trousers with white shirts and caps are worn. The girls usually wear dark blue woolen skirts with white blouses. Different schools have different requirements.

Values. The money and goods given by the voluntary agencies amounts to a sizeable sum - $35 million since 1950. As compared with the big official relief programs, which must be listed in the hundreds of millions, it isn't as momentous. But the help of the voluntary agencies takes on greater meaning because like the giving of the military men, it is direct. Always there have been representatives of a Mission or relief agency on the scene, in many cases living through some of the same trying privations as the Koreans themselves trying to do a job for them. Also, these devoted people speak the language of the Koreans, and could hear their problems, learn directly the proportions of their sufferings.  Just having these people there, and caring was of inestimable value to the morale of the people. In most cases the older Missionaries were old friends, not just to the million Christians in Korea, but also to non-Christians in all walks of life.

More than once since 1950, when a Missionary had to return to the United States on furlough, or sometimes for retirement, literally hundreds of Korean friends would come to see them off, with many a sincere tear shed at the departure.

But aside from the morale factor, the voluntary agencies have been effective in Korea because they had people who knew the country - often knew it from decades back because they were born there - knew the language, and knew the problems. They could sift the "sob stories" from the genuine pleas for needed help.

b. UNKRA and FOA.

Future? No one knows the future of welfare, reconstruction and relief in Korea, especially as it relates to the bigger programs of official status. KCAC, an Army agency supposed to be only emergency relief, has overstayed itself in Korea by more than six months. And, as mentioned, has done an exceptionally fine job. Original plans were that the United Nations Korean reconstruction Agency (UNKRA) would take over all activities of KCAC 180 days after hostilities ceased, which would have been about January of this year. Emergency needs continued and so did KCAC. But the future of KCAC is uncertain because it is military, and was designed for a military operation of preventing unrest as a necessary function of war. It did that, and has done much more.

Other big official programs on the scene in Korea include UNKRA and the Foreign Operations Administration (FOA) under the direction of Mr. C. Tyler Wood, American economist and representative of President Eisenhower. Mr. Wood's job in Korea is that not only of handling FOA but also of being economic coordinator of the several big official agencies at work on relief and reconstruction.

The big question mark looms over whether the emergency situation will be sufficiently under control by the time KCAC and the Army leave Korea, and if not, will UNKRA or FOA set up departments to accomplish relief work similar to that which KCAC is performing? In simplest terms for this study, who gives rice and medicine and clothing to Korea's 50,000 homeless children in orphanages? And who makes plans for the other estimated 50,000 homeless children for whom there is no room in the orphanages, and who are beggars, or delinquents or street children because of this lack of care?

Both UNKRA and FOA have reported that the goals of their programs are long-range reconstruction and economic betterment for Korea, and that they are not designed to perform specific welfare jobs.


On the Scene. The Korean Ministry of Social Welfare, under Dr. Solemn Park, is very much on the scene in everything having to do with Korean orphanages which are primarily its responsibilities. The size and complexity of the Ministry's problems are, however almost beyond description.

Of first importance is the fact that the Korean government has no history of child welfare, no adequate legislation and an insufficient understanding of social responsibility.

Just a Handful. One of the welfare officers in KCAC, with praise for the sincerity of many of the workers in the Ministry of Social Welfare, said that "the ROK Welfare Organization was just about adequate to handle a county welfare set up in America. A pitiful handful of mostly untrained people are trying to run a national organization."

This, added to the fact that 75 per cent of the Korean national budget goes toward maintaining their huge army - one of the largest in the world - must make their tasks seem overwhelming.

Only 25 per cent of the budget goes for all other functions of government: Welfare, Health, Reconstruction, Agriculture, Forestry, and the myriad other government responsibilities.

More important is the fact that even without a military program, Korea would not support the branches of her own government. Completely caring for her orphans alone would take a very sizeable part of her total income.

Appreciation and Coordination. The government welfare officials are very appreciative of soldier contributions and the help of all the agencies in Korea. However, Mr. Kim Hak Moo, Chief of the Bureau of Child Welfare of the Korean Government said outright in an interview that much more coordination was needed among the voluntary agencies, military units and the government (on a provincial level).

Originally, according to Mr. Kim, all help was so desperately needed there was little possibility of doing too much in any one place. Using a Korean adage, he said "We had to open and offer all four gates of Seoul, so all would give, any way they could, to whomever they could. People were dying."

Now he recommends that the giving be controlled. Soldiers have given generously to people along the front lines. But when the war was still going on, particularly toward the last, gifts might not have been properly used because there was practically no way to check on its end use.

Mr. Kim said the government was going to start using much more caution in approving orphanages, and thus try to set standards for them. Four basic principles will be involved:

1. Not to increase the number of children in institutions if possible.

2. Register the institutions legal, juridical persons.

3. Make sure the children get proper education.

4. Encourage orphanages to be smaller. (Many orphanages in Korea have 400, 500 or even 600 or more children. In these orphanages children got very little personal care. Very few orphanages are cottage or family plan. Very few have enough workers. Practically none have trained workers.)

Lack of Training. This lack of trained people is perhaps at the moment the biggest problem of the orphanages and the Welfare Ministry of the Korean government. Not only they, but also all phases of Korean relief and reconstruction face this difficulty. Almost every important task in Korea prior to 1945 was performed by Japanese. Whether it was foreman of a road repair crew, or engineer on a locomotive, or superintendent of an orphanage, the Japanese did these jobs. Sixty-five percent of the teachers in Korea were Japanese. This has left a great void of leaders. Long range suffering in Korea has stemmed far more from this curse than from the day to day tyrannies of the Japanese occupation.

The orphanages must live with this terrible lack of preparedness for their difficult tasks.


No More "Page One."  It wouldn't be an exaggeration to say that Korea is the being-forgotten country. When the war was on, Korea was "page one" in every newspaper in the world. And Korea's orphaned children were pictured regularly.

Now, Indo-China has come and gone and perhaps the next pictures of hungry children will be from Formosa, or Malaya or Burma.

But in these tropical countries, where the weather is warm all year and where food is plentiful, there aren't the heart-rending problems of icy Korea. This isn't the time to forget -Korea - her existence, nor her lessons nor her needs. Soldiers in the field, looking across the Chorwon valley, aren't forgetting any of these things. And so it is -all along the front and even in the rear areas of Korea today.

Korea, like a man with typhoid fever, has become prey to many other ills. Other maladies pile themselves on, one after another. There are too many refugees, overcrowding, so there is too little water.   Too little water means fires got out of control quickly. But fire trucks, or any trucks, and sufficient men to man them have gone to the army, so fires practically must burn themselves out.

There are too few houses, so people move into shacks - jammed one next to another.  Disease spreads. Cleanliness is impossible, A fire soon means thousands of people are without shelter.

Seoul Fire. While in Seoul preparing material for this report, the worst Seoul fire since the war took place. On the streets again were children newly made homeless crying for someone from whom they were separated. One little boy stood and watched the flames, and cried, and clung to a pitiful little parcel. He didn't know where his mother and father were. The parcel was all he had saved from his house.

One man rolled in the street, hysterical. He had just come from Pusan where he lost all his belongings and his business in the big fire there. He set up a small shop in Seoul, had it operating, and had a few possessions and a place to sleep. Now these were gone. The man had to be led away.

Help of military men in situations like these takes on great significance. Proffered blankets, food and a home for children mean ever so much more when the need for these things is as great as it still is in Korea.

Prolific.  As the Statistics will bear out, as of the summer of 1954 there were at least 51,000 children in orphanages. Even with plans to try to locate parents, most of these children must remain, in many cases for several more years.  Korea, like all Oriental countries, is prolific with her offspring, just as she is prolific in suffering.

There are over 300,000 war-widows in Korea; many of these women have put their children in orphanages. Many will never be able to take them out, because in the Korean custom, widows don't remarry. Once a family unit is broken by death, it isn't reestablished.

And if the Welfare Ministry is correct, there are still 50,000 children who need help of some kind very badly. These children may not all be orphans, but they are all needy. The tough, beggar and "hustling" children are neediest of all, and hardest to care for.

Pusan. KCAC in Pusan still picks up at least 300 children per month. Many of these are professional beggars, who have been picked up before. But many are not. The problem of beggars has to be taken seriously. It isn't the fault of military personnel, but it is true that the beggars live mostly off them. Koreans have little to offer beggar children. Around the Army Railway Transportation offices, scores of children, of whom most should be in orphanages, live off the soldiers' handouts. These boys - and sometimes little girls - are hard as nails. They're fully equipped to provide a soldier with everything from a shoeshine to a black market deal for his cigarettes, to women, often as not their sisters.

Doing something for these "Kuji" boys is one of the big problems facing South Korea's Welfare and Justice Ministries.


1. Soldier Support.  After KCAC, soldier support has been the largest single source of help to homeless children in Korea. It has, in addition, been doubly important because it was personal and direct. Their giving didn't wait for the dust to settle, or for a better day.

When this help goes?  This is the big question in Korea. There are orphanages started by and named after military units. Drive along any military supply road in Korea today and you'll see signs directing you to the "10th Brigade Orphanage," or to the "Top Three Orphanage" and almost everywhere, even when the orphanages use Korean names, underneath will be a sign saying that "This orphanage is supported by the X Engineers of the Y Division."

2. The lnterest of Individuals. The military support to orphanages in Korea, and elsewhere, if it is sustained over any long period of time, depends upon the interest of one or a very few individuals in nearby military establishments. This highly personalized interest often ceases when the individual or individuals are transferred. The highly mobile nature of military personnel render support to children's homes as anything but dependable.

The military is far wiser not to start their own orphanages that are completely dependent upon them. Sometimes a commanding officer will start an ambitious project - as in the case of the Happy Mountain and Munske orphanages - and then, when transferred, say to the government, "Here is your children's home."

KCAC Welfare Experts say that in nearly all countries the governments have a hands-off policy towards orphanages. Government orphanages are usually demonstration projects only. Thus for the military to start ordinary orphanages and turn them over to the government of South Korea is both unwise and impractical.   The too-generous support of the military is impossible to maintain. But it is not easy to drop a child from two bowls of rice per meal to two per day.

3. Future Support by ROK. It is a simple but incontestable fact that the Republic of Korea government cannot support the large number of orphanages it will be left with if the American and Allied military establishments leave Korea.

4. Three Stages. There have been three stages regarding the orphanage situation in Korea that will be good for the Chaplains to know. First, there was the Starvation Stage. In 1950, '51 and '52, "all four gates to Seoul" had to be offered when it came to helping children. The slightest help might and did save children's lives.

Second, and more recently, there has come the Investigation stage that perhaps exists today, according to the announced plans of both KCAC and the Welfare Minister. Needs are still great, but the immediate desperation was ameliorated to the extent that it's time to get rid of orphanage racketeers, the camp-following type of orphanage superintendent, and those who use hungry children for their own gains.

The third stage, the Instructional stage, will be upon us soon. This will be the long-range training, organizing, advising of the nearly 500 orphanages

In Korea the Korean orphanage workers need to learn everything - from such basic things as separating sick children from the well ones, feeding enough protein, teaching cleanliness, using modern techniques of disciplining children instead of the old Japanese militant institutional system that still prevails.

5. Deceitful Koreans.  Contrary to what many people, especially military personnel who have been stationed in Korea think about the people, because they may have been deceived by a few of the worst Koreans, the people have many admirable qualities.  One of these is their "family system" which refutes statements often propounded that "the Koreans don't care about themselves, so why should we care about them."  It is true that there is not the broad sense of social responsibility that there is in most Christian countries, but the families do their best to take care of their own.  Mr. James Metsker, of KCAC, said, "the family system is Korea's single greatest resource."  The large giving of military personnel proves, very clearly, that they have faith in the people of Korea.

Even the commanding general of one of the major branches of service in Korea gave substantial money help to an orphanage.  He gave his own funds and encouraged his men to give.  Then, almost overnight, loaded down with the good things they had received, the children and the superintendent disbursed - probably to their own homes.  It's this kind of thing that must be carefully watched in Korea, and the military units, by themselves, are not in the best position to do so.  All in all, however, there are probably no more misdemeanors of this kind in Korea than would exist in America if America were facing the same desperate problems.


1. Better Distribution. 

Military units along the front lines, or in other congested UN military areas, would do well to contact voluntary agencies to find out needs in other areas.  It has been unfortunate that giving has been so often concentrated to only immediate vicinities of military bases.  With regard to orphanages, scores of needy ones in isolated areas have been without support

AFAK has been doing its best to remedy this situation by sending "Task Forces" of Korean soldiers into rear areas to recommend projects.

An example of how this bad distribution of military giving has happened is found in the city of Kim Chun, a city of 50,000 people. This city is the one that was wiped off the map early in the war.  There is only one orphanage in the Kim Chun area.  But look at a city like Suwon, not much larger than Kim Chun.  Suwon didn't realize half the destruction and yet there are 11 orphanages in the city that accommodate more than 1,000 children. While Kim Chun's single orphanage, the Imanuel Bo Yook Wen, is crowded with only 100 children.  In the city of Suwon, within a 20-mile radius, are another 20 orphanages.

Suwon is the center of a great deal of both Army and Air Force activity. There isn't a base of any size within two hours drive of Kim Chun. The superintendent of the Immanual orphanage said, however, that there were at least 100 more real orphans in Kim Chun who desperately needed to be in a children's home.

The Provinces of Cholla Nam Do and Cholla Buk Do in Southwestern Korea are also practically without military help, and yet their cities were badly destroyed and military help is still very much needed. Missionary organizations have representatives in or near all these isolated sections of Korea. They can outline needs, and direct funds for the military personnel further north.

2. Exchanging Money, More Help to Children.

Chaplains would do well to learn about the problem of exchanging money in Korea. The legal rate of exchange for military personnel is considerably lower than the legal rate of exchange for voluntary agencies. Thus money channeled through an approved international charity working in Korea, presumably because of the  need for its services, is handled at a more realistic rate of exchange according to what the "Hwan" can really buy. It is similar to the attempts of many countries to seek dollar income and desired business. Finland, for example, has a legal rate of exchange for residents of the country of 240 Finnish Markas for one dollar. To encourage dollar-spending tourists to come to Finland, the government has established a "tourist rate" of 360 Markas to the dollar. Britain, Japan and other countries give special no tax concessions to dollar-spending, visitors. And so in Korea, voluntary agencies are given special exchange considerations.

In Korea, the exchange picture is constantly changing. As compared with the military rate of exchange, however, the "religious dollar" his usually been twice and sometimes three times as high as the "official dollar." Money thus turned over to these agencies will do three times as much good for children in orphanages.

3. Don't Underestimate Needs.

Chaplains should ponder the very large continuing expenses of taking care of a family of 100 children or more. There has been a slight tendency on the part of some in Korea to feel that when, over a period of a year, they have given many boxes of used clothing and some left-over food from the base, and a few dollars here and there, the needs of the orphanage were adequately met. Except for the few notable examples of too much already cited, such hasn't been the case. In the orphanages which Christian Children's Fund owns and operates in Korea, minimum money needs over and above the fine KCAC support are estimated to run anywhere from $5.00 to $10.00 per child per month. This is based on the more favorable rate of exchange. It does not include any major repairs to buildings. An orphanage of 100 children would thus need from $500to $1,000 per month. In Korea this is a large sum to have to come by 12 months year.

Most orphanage workers receive no salary, or only nominal salaries. Salaries are badly needed and these should be fairly adequate to attract as many educated and higher type workers as possible.

As has perhaps already been suggested adequately, Chaplains who have been discouraged by the bad use some of the orphanage workers have put their gifts to would do well to remember the tremendous temptations of great despair. One orphanage superintendent said that if anyone wanted to write a thesis for his PhD "he should analyze the Korean teardrop, and. what it has been shed for." His statement deserves some thought.

For every fake - who misuses what was given for the orphans - there are a score of fine, devoted Koreans who are doing the very best they can with almost nothing.

4.  Consider Korean Realities, Don't Aim Too High.

It is definitely wrong for military units, through their Chaplains or otherwise, to start anything they can't finish. Sometimes, as in the case of the Happy Mountain and Munske orphanages, aims and standards have been too high, more-according to Western ideas. Many units have looked to the future and left trust funds.   Others have been careful not to spoil superintendents and thus take away initiative. Others have looked toward an orphanage achieving self-support and self-sufficiency by recommending that their funds go toward buying rice and farm land, setting up vocational training for the children or cottage-type industries. These things are highly desirable.

5. Look to the Voluntary Agencies.

There are many voluntary organizations that are not just of the emergency relief type in Korea. They will work in Korea for many years to come. (A list of all the voluntary agencies is included at the end of this report.) They are happy to help military units keep in touch with either individual children or with orphanages. The various child-welfare and Missionary organizations are notable among these.

There are going to be critical days ahead for orphanages when their Army and Air Force and Navy friends are sent home or transferred to other parts of the Far East.     As some units have kept in touch with orphanages in Japan, there is an even greater need for the men to try to keep in touch with orphanages in Korea for which they have done so much up until now. Through agencies that will remain in Korea, help-can still be sent.

6.  Improve the Standards.

At the moment raising the standards in the orphanages is one of the big problems. Each military unit will have doctors, or former teachers and perhaps child welfare workers. These people can start now to recommend improvements in the orphanages they are helping financially. In many cases the military units have a more direct contact with an individual orphanage than any other organization. They can specify improvements for which their money should go.

7.  Investigate Future Needs.

In every case, Chaplains would do well to investigate the setting up of trust funds, large or small, or leaving a fund of money behind to be apportioned out over a period of time. A long-range plan of help can be established with such funds. Orphanages may have to close without this or similar help, especially those that have depended heavily upon the military in the past. Army Divisions, Air Wings, or Fleet Units have a fine opportunity to work here as an organization.

8. Determine the Needy from the Thieves.

Most military personnel stationed in Korea have been accosted by "beggar" boys that wait around the RTOs and PXs and main gates of bases for a handout. It is only worth casual mention and caution that such children, sometimes gangs of them, have been organized by Fagins, and taught to cheat, steal and procure women along with their begging. The incidence of real orphans or needy children among them is rather small now. The ROK Welfare Ministry and UNKRA are seeking some answers to this delinquency problem. No matter how woebegone such children make themselves appear, the military men who are constantly sought out by these children would do the country a favor by not patronizing them.

9. Investigate the Orphanage.

Before giving to an orphanage any substantial help, Chaplains would do well to follow these few steps:

a. Find out if the orphanage is directly or indirectly associated with any international voluntary agency. Contact the agency's representative in Korea.

b. Find out if the orphanage gets KCAC supplies regularly. If not, it has not been approved by the ROK Ministry of Welfare. Chances are there are good reasons why it has not. There are KCAC teams in each Provincial Capital. They can answer many of the Chaplain's questions. (If the orphanage does receive regular supplies it means the two representatives of the Provincial Welfare Bureau have investigated the finances and operations of the home and given their approval. Also the home has become established as a juridical person or has applied for this status or has definite plans towards so becoming. It means the orphanage has had to show good faith by owning $5000 worth of immovable property and have $1,250 in cash or negotiable securities on hand. The property cannot be sold without the consent of the board of trustees and thus no superintendent can simply dispose of holdings for his own benefit.)

c. Ask if the orphanage keeps financial records. These should be available for this inspection.

d. Try to determine from these contacts what kind of help the orphanage needs most and adjust giving accordingly.

e. Find out, if possible, whether the orphanage superintendent has had his position for a long time.



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